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Introduction
Many people in cities in the developing world are involved in 
informal activities to earn a living. These activities take place out-
side the legal framework, and are often driven by the struggle to 
survive. In many developing countries the role of informal activi-
ties has become more important (Van Dijk, 2010). Informality in 
solid waste management is a reality not only owing to its unavoid-
able nature, but also its contribution in providing service access to 
the marginalized, creating job opportunity to the urban poor and 
reducing the cost for financially-deprived municipalities (Velis 
et al., 2012). It also plays an important role in promoting indige-
nous entrepreneurship and use of indigenous resources. There is a 
need for a paradigm shift in the way informal sector service pro-
viders are viewed. Therefore, the Addis Ababa city government 
decided, in 2004, to unbundle solid waste management service 
into different functions and seek private sector involvement in pri-
mary solid waste collection by formalizing the micro-enterprises 
(< 10 employees and usually informal). This was part of a grand 
project of regulating solid waste management. In this article, 
municipal waste management refers to the function of ‘primary 
collection’.
The city administration embarked on micro-privatization as 
the attraction of standardized privatization into this activity 
would for sure be unrealistic at this point in time (Harper, 2000). 
This is attributed to the capacity of the local government to 
administer the system, the nature of the waste, the awareness and 
capacity of beneficiaries, and, above all, the willingness of the 
private sector to involve in the venture. The situation called for 
organized and regulated primary solid waste collection in which 
the micro-enterprises were taken serious. We studied this institu-
tionalization process and its outcome.
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Abstract
Privatization of urban services focuses often on the involvement of foreign enterprises. This contribution deals with micro-privatization, 
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a standard questionnaire. What are some of the factors contributing to the results of PSP in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia? 
Policies at higher levels of government definitely produced an overall climate conducive to micro-privatization and recognized the 
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Informality in solid waste management in 
Addis Ababa
There exists a vibrant informal private economy in almost all cit-
ies in the developing world, which plays a significant role in solid 
waste management. Integration of the informal activities in the 
formal sector needs to be facilitated. In the capital of Tanzania 
local, community-based organizations and small local businesses 
were facilitated to collect waste from households. Often, this 
kind of private sector involvement will lead to larger players 
entering the sector (Pan African News Agency, 2004). In Lagos 
State in Nigeria, for example, neighborhoods originally deter-
mined the type of private sector involved in the collection, trans-
portation and disposal of their waste. Formal private sector 
enterprises operated in the high-income, low population density 
areas, while the informal private operators, like cart pushers, 
operated in low-income, high population density areas. However, 
with time, both the formal and informal sectors operated in both 
areas. Some communities preferred the use of cart pushers, who 
were deemed to be more reliable, as the services from formal 
private sector became irregular (Olugbenga, 2006).
From the point of view of solid waste modernization, informal 
activities should be seen as legitimate and useful private actors in 
the solid waste system—part of the solution, rather than part of the 
problem. Until 2004, solid waste collection in Addis Ababa was a 
sector open to all who wanted to engage in it and often collection 
was done by organized and unorganized groups, or by individuals, 
whose main source of income came from other activities, for 
example daily workers, shoe shine boys and street children. 
Collection of waste by the informal sector was carried out in 
accordance with the needs of households and commercial institu-
tions without any fixed schedule. There was no concern or even 
awareness from the side of the users as to where and how the col-
lected waste was disposed of. This decision was up to the waste 
collectors. They usually preferred to dump waste in a nearby open 
space or river rather than transporting it to municipal containers.
Historically, the municipality used to administer solid waste 
management. Taking 2002 as a base year, of the total waste gener-
ated in the city, which was about 270 tonnes day-1, only 33% was 
collected by the municipality door-to-door collection service, while 
the rest was handled either by the households themselves and the 
informal waste collectors, or remained uncollected in the city.
The rapid rate of uncontrolled and unplanned urbanization in 
the city has exacerbated the problem of solid waste management. 
Attempts by the Addis Ababa city government to solve solid 
waste management problems and to provide effective services in 
urban areas have been inadequate. The government’s efforts have 
not adequately mobilized the private sector, non-governmental 
organizations or community initiatives (Kuma, 2004). Government 
structures and systems have been failing to confront the new 
challenges.
Understanding the complexity and the difficulty of the situa-
tion, the government and citizens in the city started to use a vari-
ety of methods of delivering solid waste management services. 
Contracting out to the private sector or non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs), decentralization of functions to local govern-
ments and community participation are some of the modalities 
used. Considering the constraints on public agencies to achieve 
the intended objectives, the city authorities tried to resort to one 
form of private sector participation or another.
In 2004 the city government of Addis Ababa intervened in 
solid waste collection by institutionalizing micro-enterprises. 
This was part of a grand scheme to privatize solid waste manage-
ment. Similar initiatives to allow more space for private opera-
tors were analyzed in Oduro-Kwarteng and van Dijk (2013), 
Cointreau and Coad (2000) and Coad (2005).
The day-to-day administration of the solid waste collection 
service was handled by the Kebele’s (the lowest level of admin-
istration, below the sub-city) Integrated Solid Waste Management 
case teams. These case teams liaise closely with the micro- 
enterprises, the city authority and the community. The city 
authority (agency) retains the responsibility for planning, provid-
ing guidelines and setting standards. The micro-enterprises play 
an important role in the running of the operational function of the 
solid waste collection. The privatization of the service is based on 
the principle of public ownership and private operation. The local 
government remains as the owner of the service; only the opera-
tional responsibility is given to the contracting micro-enterprises. 
Informal waste collection activities were often haphazardly car-
ried out by individuals and groups on their own initiative with no 
adequate monitoring by the municipality. Government officials 
adopted the ‘de facto’ partnership arrangement with micro- 
enterprises. Therefore, the city government saw the incorporation 
of informality (Fransen et al., 2010) as a desirable intervention in 
solid waste collection. Three types of informal solid waste col-
lectors were important informal individuals, informal groups and 
informal organized groups:
1. Informal individuals collect waste temporarily to comple-
ment their livelihood. This job helps them to meet their 
immediate needs. In many cases, their service is preferred by 
households. People involved in this category are predomi-
nantly migrants
2. Informal groups are governed by a common interest and 
background. The relations among members are managed 
more by other interests than solid waste collection. The 
groups usually consist of more than two people and they col-
lect waste temporarily to complement their income. They do 
not use any equipment
3. Informal organized groups consisting of more than two peo-
ple. They use the job both for business and as a livelihood 
strategy. They use equipment for their work and are client 
oriented. Their payment is on a monthly basis and often some 
sort of leadership exists.
Informal solid waste collection in Addis Ababa has a long his-
tory. Oral evidence suggests that it existed prior to municipal 
solid waste collection. The informal activity existed in various 
Tilaye and van Dijk 81
forms from social to commercial enterprises. Hundreds of such 
micro-enterprises were in operation in the city. They provided 
house-to-house waste collection service. The Ministry of Work 
and Urban Development launched a proposal in 2006 under its 
‘Urban Good Governance’ program about the role that could be 
played by the public sector, the people themselves and the private 
sector in relation to service delivery (MWUD, 2006). 
Subsequently, the city of Addis Ababa wished to follow-up on 
this work through various means such as building a partnership 
among all the relevant actors (formal and informal) and a cam-
paign under the motto ‘clean and green Addis’, and became con-
vinced that the task of primary solid waste collection should be 
entrusted to micro-enterprises, although the way they organized 
themselves and the structure of their governance had not really 
been institutionalized in the period 2004–2008.
Methodology
All types of informal/formal micro-enterprises were in place in 
2009, when this study was conducted. This offered an opportu-
nity to look at all arrangements and to get a good understanding 
of the process of formalization and micro-privatization in Addis 
Ababa’s waste collection. Data came from secondary and pri-
mary sources, and data collection involved both quantitative and 
qualitative techniques. One hundred and sixty micro-enterprises 
were included in the survey, about 35% of the total number. 
Secondary methods of data collection consisted of review of 
research reports, government official records, project documents, 
operational manuals and reports of different kinds; monthly, bi-
annual and annual publications of the aligned institutions are 
taken as sources. Ten sub-cities were selected as sample areas. 
Five Kebeles were selected from each sub-city. The selection of 
these areas took into account whether the settlements were 
planned or unplanned, population density and the income level of 
the inhabitants. Stratified random sampling was employed for the 
survey. Sampling was done to ensure all of the various types of 
micro-enterprises within a particular area were represented. 
Stratified sampling was used in order to get a representative sam-
ple from each Kebele with specific type of the enterprise. Then, 
from each Kebele, 2–5 micro-enterprises were selected randomly 
based on the number and type of micro-enterprises available to 
each Kebele.
Survey, interviews and focus group discussions were used for 
primary data collection preceded by a reconnaissance visit and 
observation. A survey questionnaire was set for service providers 
to obtain primary data from micro-enterprises. Fifteen focus 
group discussions were conducted with different stakeholders: 
officers from the local government, technicians at the local gov-
ernment level, truck drivers, heads/owners of private micro-
enterprises, workers of private micro-enterprises, workers of 
cooperative micro-enterprises and household groups. Twenty-
eight key informant interviews were held with representatives of 
the public sector at different levels (at the city council level, the 
sub-city level and local officials) to obtain data on solid waste 
collection and to get their views on solid waste collection through 
a public–private partnership arrangement (Bartone et al., 1991; 
Cointreau and Coad, 2000; Coad, 2005). The results are pre-
sented as follows and special attention will be paid to the increase 
in coverage, the type of clients served, the contractual models 
used, and the initiation and institutionalization of the formaliza-
tion process.
Results
Micro-enterprises took over waste collection from the public sec-
tor and the households, and improved primary waste collection 
coverage from about 89 tonnes day-1 in 2002 to 121 tonnes day-1 
in 2008 (36% improvement) (Figure 1). Interviews with city offi-
cials confirmed that, despite improvement in the collection ser-
vice, micro-enterprises were unable to provide the level of service 
that was needed.
The level of demand or willingness to pay for primary solid 
waste collection services was low and difficult to ascertain. Some 
residents failed to realize that they have to pay for the service. 
Meanwhile, regarding enforcement regulation there was no 
municipal sanction for households who are not involved in the 
service scheme. Moreover, if the service provided by primary 
collectors is disrupted, the households have no place to appeal. In 
some cases, waste was dumped at the municipal skips by house-
holds themselves, although people lived in areas with limited 
access to municipal skips.
Private micro-enterprises focused on better-off clients and 
worked in more accessible areas. The ability to pay by house-
holds determines the engagement of private micro-enterprises 
in solid waste collection. Cooperative micro-enterprises were 
less successful than private micro-enterprises. During inter-
viewing, local government bodies argued that private micro-
enterprises have the problem of temptation to skim off the 
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Figure 1. Households (HH) served by micro-enterprises 
(MEs) in Addis Ababa.
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wealthiest households (who are most willing to pay and whose 
trash is likely to contain the most reusable and recyclable 
materials).
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of private and cooperative 
micro-enterprises solid waste collectors in Addis Ababa engaged 
in primary solid waste collection in different sub-cities before 
June 2009. Private micro-enterprises are concentrating in the 
sub-cities of Bole, Yeka and Kirkos. Bole and Yeka are the sub-
cities comprising better-off and more affluent inhabitants, while 
Kirkose is an old, central and densely populated area. The pre-
existing cooperative micro-enterprises were less successful than 
private micro-enterprises. One of the reasons they mentioned 
during the survey was that they were infringed and work in poor 
and infrastructurally less developed areas that are abandoned by 
the private micro-enterprises. The potential business areas are 
already taken up by the private micro-enterprises.
Contractual models used in solid waste 
collection in Addis Ababa
The ‘Urban Good Governance’ package (MWUD, 2006) of 
Ethiopia issued a document aimed at facilitating the delivery of 
services to the inhabitants in a cost-effective and efficient man-
ner. These ‘new public management’ principles emphasize the 
importance of following different approaches to make service 
delivery and revenue collection efficient and effective (Van Dijk, 
2006). In this regard, putting in place a service delivery plan and 
a system enforced by contracts with goals to utilize the private 
sector’s skill and capacity is one of the major achievements of 
this process. ‘Service users should pay’ was another principle 
that was adhered to. A sustainable solution to waste problems in 
the larger cities in low- and middle-income countries requires a 
self–financing system in which all the real costs incurred are 
recovered through contributions from the beneficiaries (Harper, 
2000). It is only when the ‘social need’ overtly transforms itself 
as ‘economic need’ that private solid waste collection can become 
a reality (Coad, 2005; Cointreau and Coad, 2000).
Interviews with local officials revealed that before 2004 the 
micro-privatization of solid waste collection service provision 
was at its pilot stage. The system was more of the open competi-
tion type, but as time progressed the relationship with the govern-
ment was predominantly the franchise formula with some 
elements of open competition. The private collection agents 
received support from the city, though the arrangements were not 
clearly defined, meaning that there was little direct interaction 
between the collection teams and the municipality.
After the arrival of the provisional city government in the year 
2004, waste collection has gradually attracted more attention 
from officials (Zelalem, 2006). Later, when commercial private 
micro-enterprises were introduced in the city, the relationships 
between municipal authorities and micro-enterprises changed. 
Two types of contractual arrangements were introduced: fran-
chising (in the period 2005–2009) and contract-out arrangements 
(after 2009) (Figure 3).
Contract relation under franchise 
arrangement (2005–2008)
Focus group discussion with owners of private micro-enterprises 
revealed that micro-enterprises were collecting waste from 
households to municipal skips (primary collection), while the 
city government was responsible for collecting waste from each 
of the intermediate neighborhood collection bins (secondary col-
lection and transporting). Micro-enterprises collected the user 
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sub-cities in 2008.
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enterprises
Municipality
Contract, regulate
and impose tax
Pay for the service
Community Supervise
Deliver the service
Model 2: Direct contract-out arrangement
Micro-enterprises
Municipality
Community
Deliver the service
Contract, pay for
the service and
supervise
Regulate and impose tax
Model 1: Franchise arrangement
Figure 3. Contract models for involving micro-enterprises 
in Addis Ababa: solid waste collection (adapted from IPES, 
1995).
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charges from each household and other establishments that 
received services. Attempts were made to introduce tendering, 
but not on a real competitive basis.
Moreover, under the franchise arrangement some micro- 
enterprises started to partially sub-contract their working areas to 
individuals or groups who acted as labor providers. The sub-con-
tractor would provide workers that would accomplish the task, as 
per the agreement made between the owner and the sub-contractor. 
There was also an arrangement that contract workers are employed 
by the micro-enterprises as casual labor. As one micro-entrepreneur 
said during focus group discussion it was not uncommon for some 
private commercial micro-enterprises to sign a contract for 3 years 
under a franchise arrangement. Micro-enterprises used to be con-
tacted by the Kebele to renew their contract agreement when the 
contract period was completed. There were 288 private and 328 
cooperative micro-enterprises by the year 2008. At the end of 2009, 
all these private companies were forced to change into cooperatives 
under a contract-out arrangement.
Contract relation under a contract-out 
arrangement (after 2009)
Contracting-out became the new mode of solid waste collection 
contract arrangement after 2009 (Domberger and Hall, 1996). 
Unlike franchising and open competition, where private agents 
collect fees directly from users, in a contracting-out arrangement 
the local governments pay the contractors according to the vol-
ume (m3) of solid waste collected and hauled to the municipal 
skip, that is they contract-out solid waste collection to micro-
enterprises to get them to collect waste from households and 
transfer it to the municipal skips at the designated place while 
keeping up the cleanness of their respective working zone.
The micro-privatization process of the service is based on the 
principle of public ownership and private operation. It is a con-
dition where the public sector remains responsible for direct and 
indirect provision, but contracts out the service delivery to the 
private sector (Grimshaw and Willmott, 2002). The local gov-
ernment remains the owner of the service; only the operational 
responsibility is given to the contracting micro-enterprises. It 
was observed during the field study that the day-to-day adminis-
tration of the solid waste collection service was handled by the 
Kebele’s Integrated Solid Waste Management case team. The 
case team liaises closely with the micro-enterprises, the city 
authority and the community. The city authority’s, Sanitation, 
Beautification and Park Development Agency (SBPDA), 
remains responsible for planning, providing guidelines and set-
ting standards. The cooperative micro-enterprises play an impor-
tant role in solid waste collection. When the city authorities 
introduced the contract-out system in 2009, they subsequently 
introduced four reforms:
•• shift from a franchise to a contract-out arrangement;
•• all micro-enterprises were obliged to change into cooperatives;
•• all households in the city should be serviced and they are 
required to pay for the service;
•• waste buying from micro-enterprises happens on a volume 
basis rather than providing a contract to do the job.
The micro-enterprises are obliged by the contract to collect waste 
only from households and their surroundings. The contract also 
stipulates that the contracting enterprises should abide by the 
regulation for service provision, such as obtaining the required 
necessary equipment and respecting standards of hygiene and 
workers safety. It has been observed during the field work that 
the contract was awarded to cooperative micro-enterprises with-
out competitive bidding procedures. This violates the foundation 
of market-based competition among micro-enterprises and the 
government’s expectations of cost-saving and quality improve-
ment (Bel and Warner, 2008). The cooperatives were also reor-
ganized and forced to work only within the locality they were 
assigned to. Micro-enterprises obtained a licence from the local 
government for the area in which they are working. They cannot 
open any branches in other locations or extend their business to 
other locations. The guidelines have banned their right to freely 
move and open branches in the other parts of the city.
Interviews with local officials revealed that the absence of a 
well-defined service area appeared to be one of the controversial 
issues and remained a source of conflict among different actors 
engaged in solid waste collection. Micro-enterprise garbage col-
lectors did not have fixed collection routes, and there was open 
competition in certain areas. This resulted in inefficiencies, as up 
to three (or more) different collectors may work in the same street 
at the same time. This situation has led to selectively contracting 
with households that can afford relatively high service charges. It 
also limited inspection and monitoring of the performance of 
solid waste collection as there was no single enterprise to be held 
accountable. In addition, this condition involved extra expenses, 
as each enterprise had to deploy their employees to the sparsely 
and haphazardly located clients to collect service charges.
This negative experience led the SBPDA to prepare a direc-
tive on ‘the delineation of service areas and service provision’. 
The SBPDA initiated a program to allocate zones to micro- 
enterprises and to give them a permit to operate, to prevent reck-
less dumping and to enhance accountability within their respec-
tive jurisdiction.
Given these reforms, local governments promised to assign 
between 650 and 1050 households to each micro-enterprise, and 
every enterprise works in its own jurisdiction only. The assumption 
by local governments was that zoning can force micro-enterprises 
to render account and they were expected to improve sanitation 
both at the neighborhood and the city level. Moreover, every 
household is required to pay for the solid waste collection service.
During focus group discussions micro-enterprises argued that 
during the introduction of zoning there were issues overlooked 
by the local government, such as wealth of the households, dis-
tance to a transfer station, access to alternative illegal dumping 
sites and the capacity of micro-enterprises. Different enterprises 
have different capacities, which determines how much micro-
enterprises earn.
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Some micro-enterprises had a problem with zoning as it was 
not done fairly by the Kebele. Owing to the new zoning rear-
rangement micro-enterprises lost long-term clients and they were 
forced to work with new ones. In some cases, those newly reor-
ganized micro-enterprises are unable to manage the number of 
households they have been given because they do not have 
enough equipment, while others are complaining that the number 
of members in some cooperative micro-enterprises is too high 
and not in line with the size of the working zone allocated to 
them. Finally some enterprises do not get their monthly payment 
on time.
Under the contract-out system micro-enterprises do not sell 
the cleaning service, but they are selling the waste. Hence, micro-
enterprises started to collect waste not only from the households 
but also from at every corner of the city. Moreover, it is observed 
that introduction of waste-buying by local governments suddenly 
increased the volume of waste handled at secondary points. 
Subsequently, the capacity within the public sector lacked the 
ability to cope with the new way of doing business. Eventually, 
this approach not only inflated the amount of waste that could go 
to the landfill, but also had an effect on recycling and compost-
ing, that is much of the waste that had been used as compost (as 
> 60% of the city waste is organic) was now being transported to 
the dumping site.
A key component of a local government’s authority is to raise 
sufficient revenues to cover the payment for the volume of waste 
collected by micro-enterprises, and to supervise and monitor the 
cleanliness of the areas in question. It is observed that sometimes 
there was disagreement between the public officials (who judge 
the volume of waste) and the micro-enterprises. The officials 
complained that the waste is full of grass, which makes up the 
volume. However, there was no category of waste specified by 
the concerned body in the buying process. Also, there was no 
proper arrangement to measure the volume of waste. Hence, this 
is subjective. The equipment varies, and the nature and type of 
waste had not been taken into account when the system was 
developed. Micro-enterprises have accused local governments of 
poor and non-standardized measuring of the waste volume. In 
addition, even some households started complaining about giv-
ing waste freely to micro-enterprises as they heard micro- 
enterprises sell the waste to the local government.
Regarding the contract period, cooperative micro-enterprises 
signed only for a few months to test whether the pilot work was 
feasible or not, arguing that as a new group it was difficult to 
sign a long-term contract with the local government owing to the 
difficulty of predicting what will happen regarding the interest 
of the workers and the financial position of the enterprise. More 
than 90% of the micro-enterprises have a contract of < 6 months. 
Moreover, local governments are not sure whether the fees col-
lected from the community are sufficient to buy all the waste 
generated in the city. This makes local governments reluctant to 
follow the contract arrangement system very strictly.
Furthermore, as the contract system was totally tuned by the 
city government to cooperatives, some are pessimistic about the 
feasibility of this new arrangement, arguing that the system 
allows only for survival (livelihood) of members of coopera-
tives. In some cases, many people need to share the revenue, 
while the contract limits the possibility of expanding their busi-
ness. Individual efforts are also disregarded, despite a lot of 
differences among members according to age, literacy rate, 
awareness level, and physical and mental strength. Given the 
above situation the workers argued that it was hard to sign a 
long-term contract.
The workers of cooperative micro-enterprises mentioned dur-
ing the focus group discussion a number of problems associated 
with the newly developed contract arrangement:
•• the contract forms were not uniform;
•• the contracts were unilateral and press the contractor to 
perform
•• the contract periods varied from Kebele to Kebele, even from 
enterprise to enterprise within the same Kebele.
During the interviews with officials they argued that the contract-
out arrangement did not deal with the problem of temptation by 
micro-enterprises to skim off the wealthiest households, which 
are the most willing to pay and their trash is likely to contain the 
most reusable materials. This leaves the poorest households with 
no collection system.
Initiation and the role of the public sector
To understand the challenges in the formalization process of solid 
waste collection micro-enterprises in Addis Ababa, the interven-
tions made by public sector were considered from the point of 
view of initiation and institutionalization. Table 1 shows the sur-
vey results of how and by whom solid waste collecting micro-
enterprises are initiated in Addis Ababa city, as responded to by 
the micro-entrepreneurs. As well as the approximately 38% reor-
ganized existing informal waste collecting enterprises, which are 
now in the formal sector, approximately 23% replied that they 
decided themselves to organize a group of unemployed (or under-
employed) young people and women from the community to col-
lect solid waste from participating households and to transport it 
to a transfer station located centrally in each neighborhood. 
Finally, about 38% of the respondents said that they are involved 
in the work as they have been employees of private micro- 
enterprises. The micro-enterprises are the groups who joined the 
Table 1. Who initiated micro-enterprises to solid waste 
collection task?
Frequency Valid percent Cumulative percent
Kebele 58 37.7 37.7
Self 35 22.7 60.4
Private 59 38.3 98.7
Community 2 1.3 100.0
Total 154 100.0  
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solid waste collection after becoming aware of the profitability of 
the activity.
Other developments also led the city government’s SBPDA to 
reorient its service provision scheme. According to interviews 
with officials from SBPDA the process of formalization of solid 
waste collection micro-enterprises was stimulated by the grow-
ing concern of the city administration that it would not be possi-
ble to efficiently handle solid itself. Various internal and external 
factors (unemployment, increasing service demand, cost reduc-
tion strategy of the city and donor perspectives) have compelled 
the city authorities to change their policies concerning informal 
refuse collection, from neglect or repression, to tolerance or 
active support. This paved the way for the gradual withdrawal of 
the city government from the primary collection by appointing 
the micro-enterprises (Figure 4).
The households’ and workers’ points of 
view
Focus group discussions with households brought out that, in due 
course, micro-enterprises active in solid waste collection in 
Addis Ababa have received recognition from the community. 
Community leaders suggested that micro-enterprises were pro-
viding more effective and responsive services than previously 
provided by the public sector. Interviews with owners of private 
micro-enterprises revealed that households and other users appre-
ciate the service (Kassim and Ali, 2006). In-depth interviews 
with owners of micro-enterprises revealed that the relations 
between micro-enterprises before 2004, when the informal 
scheme was dominant, took the form of conflicts, competition 
and collaboration. There was an opportunity for all kinds of 
micro-enterprise to work freely and exchange experiences. 
Gradually, in the period 2005–2008, when the private micro-
enterprise scheme became dominant, conflicts developed as pri-
vate micro-enterprises created a competitive environment 
through price reductions, better quality services and improve-
ment of the worker’s discipline.
Focus group discussions with workers of micro-enterprises 
revealed that there were two major groups of workers. The first 
group involves newcomers to the city. Some still have their own 
farm in a rural area and they are casual workers. They work for a 
short period of time and leave when they see other opportunities. 
The other group involves local people. The attitude of these work-
ers depends on whether they work for a cooperative or a private 
micro-enterprise. Those who are organized as cooperatives are 
reluctant to do a good job as they get minimum rewards. Workers 
from private micro-enterprises claim that owners of private micro-
enterprises swindle money that belongs to the workers.
The majority of the workers in the cooperative micro- 
enterprises are women and because there is no adequate material 
support they are sometimes forced to use their back to transport 
the waste from the households to the transfer stations. Moreover, 
during the field work it was observed that facilities have deterio-
rated and working conditions worsened as there is poor mainte-
nance and no replacement of equipment under the cooperative 
arrangement.
Moreover, focus group discussions with owners of private 
commercial enterprises revealed only a minimum of collabora-
tion between the public sector and micro-enterprises. Poor coor-
dination between different levels of government was often 
mentioned by the micro-enterprises, which resulted in a poor per-
formance of the waste collection micro-privatization process. 
Micro-enterprises had limited relations with the city administra-
tion bureaus and reasonably fair relations with their respective 
Kebeles. They have a quasi-official linkage with the City 
Sanitation, Beautification and Park Development Agency. 
Moreover, decisions are less transparent, even among different 
levels of government. What they are doing is in conflict with 
each other most of the time. Interviews with local officials 
revealed that part of this non-transparency among public sector 
offices arose owing to the fact that there were different interests 
within the public sector, implying different motives for govern-
ment intervention. Consequently, this led to conflicts of interest 
between different parts of government. Local governments, 
despite being overwhelmed by various strategies coming from 
the top, were unable to successfully accomplish these tasks. In 
the meantime, as they were responsible for local issues, such as 
cleaning up of their vicinity, they could barely address the inter-
ests of city officials and the community as well.
Institutionalization: No orderly 
authorization process
At the beginning, authorization of micro-enterprises in Addis 
Ababa took place through various agencies with different modal-
ities. Secondary sources from city government offices confirmed 
that, initially, the authority to promote formalization of micro-
enterprises was given to the Trade and Industry Bureau and to the 
Micro- and Small Scale Enterprise Development Agency 
(MSSEDA). The SBPDA followed up the work technically. 
Focus group discussions with various workers revealed that 
micro-enterprises secure their licences from different sources. 
Licensing procedures were based on the type of micro-enterprise. 
Private commercial micro-enterprises got their licence from the 
sub-city’s Trade and Industry Bureau and were expected to pay 
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Figure 4. Involvement of micro-enterprises (ME) in solid 
waste collection services.
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tax to the city government. Cooperatives micro-enterprises were 
getting their licences from the MSSEDA in the Kebele with the 
approval of the cooperative office, and they were tax-exempt.
Other enterprises obtained their licences from the city’s 
Health Bureau. Some received their licence from the Trade and 
Industry Bureau, a work permit from the sub-city and in agree-
ment with the Kebele. In some cases, the community provides 
authority to micro-enterprises to work in their neighborhood. 
Some workers are migrants or street people with no official resi-
dency and lack an identification card, which does not allow them 
to work in public offices. In such cases, the community provides 
them with support and negotiated with the Kebele.
Some micro-enterprises have a written agreement with the 
Kebele, given by the waste management team. Some obtain tem-
porary work permits from local governments, or they had only an 
oral agreement with the Kebele. Still others use training certifi-
cates that have been given by the government and NGOs as a 
licence, and consider themselves authorized to do the job. Until 
2009, all private commercial micro-enterprises, cooperative 
micro-enterprises and informal groups were working side-by-
side in the solid waste collection system, receiving different 
types of licence from different sources.
Interviews with local government officials revealed that 
although primary solid waste collection was handed over to 
micro-enterprises, the institutional arrangement was public own-
ership and private operation. As the ownership of the service 
belonged to the public sector, the public sector remained respon-
sible for indirect provision. Given these institutional arrange-
ments, the legitimacy of micro-enterprises is challenged in many 
ways. Focus group discussions with owners and workers revealed 
that, initially, the government tried to force private commercial 
enterprises to be organized under the auspice of MSSEDA, rather 
than assisting them as independent entities. This is against the 
will of most micro-enterprises, who prefer to operate as private 
firms. Moreover, the official capital requirements are a barrier to 
enterprises becoming formal. As stated in the guidelines for 
micro-enterprises engaged in solid waste collection and transpor-
tation, they are expected to have the necessary equipment 
(AACG, 2004). Registration for tax purposes is not a viable 
option for some informants, as the sector appears to them as 
unstable. Thus, the cost of registration coupled with the perceived 
irregular and erratic nature of the business discouraged them to 
become legitimate. Studies have estimated that full compliance 
with all regulations could mean closure of business. In Latin 
America, the cost of remaining legal varied between 17 and 70% 
of annual profits of the unit. In Bujumbura (Burundi) it was esti-
mated that the revenue of micro-enterprises would be reduced by 
48% if all regulations are strictly enforced (Nas and Jaffe, 2004).
The institutionalization of the micro-enterprises was not con-
fined to the promotion of efficiency of solid waste collection. 
Rather, its focus was on boosting employment. In this regard, the 
government has a city-wide plan to deploy about 10,000 unem-
ployed people in the solid waste collection sector. Accordingly, 
each Kebele has its own targeted quota and each Kebele official 
is held accountable for the number of people it organizes.
Micro-enterprises were asked about the level of agreement 
they have on ‘the public sector’s role as enabler’. Thirty percent 
of the surveyed enterprises agree that public sector could be a 
facilitator, while 35% disagree. Twenty-eight percent of them are 
neutral (7% no answer). Micro-enterprises stated the reasons 
behind the poor facilitation role of the public sector: they got no 
response for their queries, appeal is not heard and no fair response 
is given to micro-enterprises. Moreover, rules and regulations are 
not respected, and the situation is unpredictable. An upcoming 
new regulation does not address the problems of micro- 
enterprises and is too administration-centered. Micro-enterprises 
and the public sector do not trust each other. This makes solid 
waste collection business unpredictable, which eventually makes 
the business unattractive. Micro-enterprises were asked about 
their freedom of decision. The survey showed that 22% consid-
ered that they do not have any freedom to decide on their matters. 
Thirty-one percent said they have little freedom, while 29% said 
they have some freedom to decide (12% no answer). Also, regu-
lation is changing without the consent and willingness of the 
partners in question, as decisions are made unilaterally.
Discussion
Three patterns evolved as the result of the government interven-
tion to integrate solid waste collection micro-enterprises in Addis 
Ababa. The first pattern was that all the pre-existing informal 
actors and emerging private commercial and cooperative micro-
enterprises co-existed, although with conflicts in a hostile envi-
ronment. Second, it has been noted that there was a trend among 
informal solid waste collectors and cooperatives to move out to 
the marginalized areas. The third pattern to emerge was an effort 
by the government to gradually replace the private commercial 
businesses by cooperative micro-enterprises. The development 
of these patterns can be explained by the interplay of the pre-
existing informal solid waste collecting actors, the evolving pri-
vate micro-enterprises and the initiative of local administration 
officials to institutionalize the cooperative micro-enterprises.
The potential of private commercial micro-enterprises seemed 
to have been grasped better, at least until 2008, in Addis Ababa. 
Entrepreneurs were free to arrange their own mix of labor input 
and technology which resulted in a certain diversity of approaches. 
It was well attuned to specific local circumstances. Monitoring 
and control mechanisms, and proper contract arrangement 
existed. However, the city government—preoccupied with con-
cerns of public health and city beautification—wanted to answer 
these shortcomings in a technocratic manner. Contrary to the 
widely admitted need for competition to make private sector par-
ticipation work, the city granted cooperative rights to micro-
enterprises. This intervention, despite possible loss in service 
effectiveness, made business principles lose ground. This goes 
against the logic of market-based competition among micro-
enterprises and the government expectation of cost-saving and 
quality improvement.
It was hard for cooperative micro-enterprises to continue the 
work as they lacked experience, were deprived of sufficient 
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equipment and facilities, and had a poorly trained work force. 
Moreover, the partnership strategy in the contract arrangement 
and fee payment procedure did not sufficiently address the inter-
ests of the communities, which received differential treatment 
(and cross-subsidies) instead of a uniform approach. Zonal 
restriction resulted in fewer opportunities for micro-enterprises 
to compete and improve their service, as well as to expand their 
business.
Conclusions
Involving micro-enterprises as service providers must be tailored 
to specific local circumstances. The dynamics of solid waste col-
lection reform in Addis Ababa are predominantly dictated by the 
relation between the local administration, communities and 
micro-enterprises. The question was how new opportunities cre-
ated by formalization were taken up by communities and micro-
enterprises, and how the authorities in the framework of 
micro-privatization used them. Special attention was paid to the 
increase in coverage and waste collected achieved.
Micro-enterprises in Addis Ababa city waste collection contrib-
ute tremendously by exploring opportunities that are appropriate to 
the milieu of the public sector and the community at large. Waste 
collection micro-enterprises in Addis Ababa exist because of pub-
lic demand for the service, poverty and high unemployment. None 
of these factors is likely to disappear in the foreseeable future. 
Although policies at higher levels of government definitely pro-
duced an overall climate conducive to the rise of micro-privatiza-
tion, the fate of the micro-enterprises was largely determined by 
the reforms undertaken at local government level.
The initiation and institutionalization of the formalization 
process was not without problems. The public sector over-
stressed the autonomy of micro-enterprises. The rapid changes in 
policies made waste-collecting micro-enterprises lose confidence 
in the government and more dependent on the public sector. It 
meant more costs as micro-enterprises had to adapt to the new 
arrangements. For example, Kokeb enterprise, in the sub-city of 
Nifas-silk lafto, started its business in 2001 as a private enterprise 
and in 2004 it was forced by local government to change to a 
cooperative. In 2005 it got the freedom to work again as a private 
micro-enterprise, and in 2009, for the second time, it was forced 
to change into a cooperative.
Strictly speaking, there is no clear strategy set for these micro-
enterprises at that level. This prevents the full economic benefits 
being reaped from the market. Micro-enterprises working in solid 
waste collection in Addis Ababa felt the unpredictability of the city 
authority as a business partner owing to frequently changing poli-
cies and unbalanced regulations, while the latter accused the micro-
enterprises of violation of health and environmental standards. The 
study shows the continued power of the state and its agents in shap-
ing the developments in this domain. The policy at the national 
level recognized the need to develop micro-enterprises, but it was 
not clear what precise role the micro-enterprises are to play in solid 
waste management.
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